Fig. 3-1

Fig. 3-2

Wing Segment

Fig. 3-3

Wing Segment

Fig. 3-4

Wing Segment

Fig. 3-8

Fig. 3-9

Fig. 3-8 to the left was created from an image in the document STS-107_Event_Sequence.pdf published by the official investigation.  It depicts how the wiring cable harness for the temperature sensors that monitor the hydraulic elevon actuator return lines, points 5, 6, 7 and 8, for hydraulic systems 1, 2 and 3 is routed very close to RCC panels 6, 7, 8 and 9.  This places them very close to the location of the theorized breach.

The Aerosurface Servoamplifier unit shown above in Fig. 3-9 is the type of unit designated as ASA 4 in Fig. 3-6.  There are 4 ASA's mounted in the aft avionics bays of the shuttle.  The gray rectangular box directly to the right of ASA 4 in Fig. 3-8 appears to be some other avionics unit but was not defined in STS-107 Event Sequence.pdf.  It may be a Multiplexer Demultiplexer (MDM) unit for converting the signals from the sensors.  In the document STS-107 Sensor Failure.pdf that preceded STS-107 Event Sequence.pdf a unit in a similar location was labeled 50/P47.

The official explanation for the faulty temperature sensor readings from the left elevon actuator hydraulic supply and return lines is that heat attacking the wiring harness caused electrical shorts and eventual failures.  The problem with this explanation and the diagram in Fig. 3-8 used by the C.A.I.B. to justify their conclusion is that it is not believable from either a design standpoint or within the context of the available Space Shuttle documentation.

It makes absolutely no sense to route wiring that originates near the rear part of the wing at the elevon actuators up and around the leading edge.  All of the other wiring from that area is routed directly to the main cable tray that runs the length of the fuselage, see any of the diagrams to the right.

Closeout photos, see below, show how cables originating from sensors near the leading edge of the wing are routed to the side of the fuselage where they are bundled into a harness which then travels towards the rear of the wing where it enters the main cable tray.

Closeout Photos

The slight of hand trick of rerouting the sensor cables near the leading edge of the wing where they will be affected by the influx of hot plasma was done by simply penciling them in where they were needed, see Fig. 3-8.  This was done to explain telemetry data that seems strange and at the same time to legitimize the breached wing scenario.  The closeout photos showing wires in the RCC panel sections made it all that much easier to believe.  All of the available shuttle documentation such as the diagrams to the right show the actual routing of power and signal cables within the Space Shuttle wing.

Space Shuttle wiring in mid and aft fuselage including left inboard and outboard elevons.

Mid and aft fuselage hydraulic line routing including left inboard and outboard elevons.

General shuttle wiring diagram with cable tray locations as seen from bottom.

Fig. 3-9

Fig. 3-9 to the left indicates how cable and wire harnesses should be routed through the wing of the Space Shuttle.  All of the wiring for both sensors and component power are guided to the rear of the wing where they are then directed to the main cable trays that run the length of the shuttle.

Fig. 3-8 is essentially the original diagram created by the C.A.I.B. for the purpose of explaining how and why sensors located near the rear of the wing were affected by damage near the wings leading edge.  Only minor changes were made to the original diagram to help with this explanation.

All wires seen near the leading edge originate from sensors in that area and travel to the rear as shown.  No wires that originate near the rear of the wing travel forward unless they need to reach some additional components such as the landing gear.

The fact that all of this was done to prove the existence of the left wing breach is a good indication that the breach in fact did not exist.